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Nersoyan: Action in Indian Philosophy

Action in Indian Philosophy
H. James Nersoyan

Recently a philosopher writing a new exegesis of the Tractatus in the Journal
of Philosophy presented as his justification for writing yet another piece on
Wittgenstein the quip that rubbish is rubbish but the history of rubbish is
scholarshipP I present what I hope is a contribution to the concept of action in
Indian philosophy roughly in the same spirit. W. D. Hart, the author of the article
I refer to, did not mean of course that the philosophy of Wittgenstein is rubbish;
neither do I mean that Indian philosophy is rubbish. It most certainly is not.
What is meant is that it is possible to present a point of view sympathetically
without wholly committing oneself to it, and this is what I prop ose to do.
When we contrast the phrase 'Indian philosophy' to a phrase like 'Indian
mathematics,' we may become sensitive to the fact that the phrase 'Indian
mathematics' sounds odd in a way in which 'Indian philosophy' does not. There
is a certain parochialism to philosophy which is why it admits of an adjective
indicating geographic area or culture, and which is one reason why someone
else 's philosophy sometimes simply does not taste good. Yet we must be able
to distinguish between taste and, say, nutritive value.
What gives Indian philosophy its local flavor? It is certainly not insights that
the West never had. It is rather certain emphases and a peculiar terminology.
Three such emphases are related to the theory of action : the first is that the
world is an illusion, although dissent from this proposition is not uncommon
in Indian philosophical literature. The second emphasis, to be pointed out with
the same reservation, is that atman is Brahman. The term atman like the Greek
psyche or the Hebrew ruach originally meant breath. The term "self" appears to
be an adequate translation of atman. As to Brahman, it is a term to whose
referent would apply such Western terms or phrases as Fichte's Absolute Ego,
Hegel's Idea, Spencer's Unknowable, Tillich's Ground, Jaspers' Encompassing, but
the list cannot be completed. The atman, then , is Brahman. The third of the
emphases I have in mind which is related to the Indian theory of action is the
very characteristic world-view that to live in the world is to endure pain or,
more generally, to suffer.
Let me make some brief comments on the first two of these emphases ; some
clarification will be brought to the third emphasis as I proceed. The texts on
which I will rely for these comments will be the Upanishads, the Samkhya-Yoga
and the Vedanta as interpreted largely by Samkara.
To begin with the view that the world is an illusion.
The Sanskrit term maya is rather well known in English-speaking circles and

Published by eCommons, 1972

35

1

University of Dayton Review, Vol. 9 [1972], No. 2, Art. 6
often rendered as illusion. It goes without saying that one must not be misled
by the term illusion. Any unreality attributed to the phenomenal world in the
advaita Vendanta system is no excuse for treating the world as if it were a
vast, variegated mirage. In a world which is unreal in the sense of the Vedanta,
such terms as solid, painful and the like do not lose their relevance.
In the philosophical Vedantic tradition the concept of maya is appealed to by
way of specifying the relation between the transcendent Brahman, infinite, immutable, eternal and subject to no attributes, and the phenomenal world where
Brahman is nevertheless present, and for which it is responsible in some way.
This fact which the seer intuitively knows to be the case does not lend itself
to a description which is logically satisfactory. The best one can do in the circumstances is to say that the Absolute has a power, namely maya, whereby it
turns itself partially into the world of space and time. By a further extension
maya comes to mean the world itself.
Bhagavat is a Vedic deity. In what he says of himself one sees the metaphysics
of maya taking shape: "In the beginning I alone existed in and by myself and
there was nothing other than myself, whether in a manifested or unmanifested
form. After the creation of diversities also I alone exist-because all these are
my self-manifestations and nothing has existence independent and separate from
mine.-After the destruction of all these diversities also I alone will exist-because
all my temporal self-manifestations will be dissolved in time in me."2
It should not be difficult to present objections to Bhagavat's claim. We may
say, for instance, that language is modelled after phenomena and that it cannot
therefore give us any information about anything behind phenomena. There is a
certain use of language in the Upanishads which seems to be designed to circumvent
this objection. This use consists in the flagrant violation, again and again, of the
most elementary laws of logic. Examples are: "This verily is that," or "it moves. It
moves not. It is far, and it is near. It is within all this, and it is outside all this."
Such contradictions appear to be designed to make language do what it cannot
do otherwise, namely, let us have a peek into a reality which it may be veiling.
As the two elements of the opposition cancel each other out, the ensuing silence
is the opening to the Being behind or at the root of maya. In this sense, or from
this perspective Brahman is not to be described but to be realized. In the Kena
Upanisad we read: "Brahman is known when it is realized in every state of mind."
I suggest that rather than "illusory" we could translate maya taken as an
adjective as "mythic," in the sense that a myth is to the meaning it simultaneously
hides and reveals as the world is to Brahman. A myth is true and valuable if you
know how to read it and read between the lines. It is false and worthless otherwise. So is the world. Anyone who knows how to read or '''demythicize'' the
world will realize Brahman. Others are kept in avidya or ignorance. This is, I
believe, what is chiefly meant by the characteristically Indian statement that the
world is maya. The world is maya also because it is in time, perishable, while
Brahman and non-being are altogether irreconcilable.
The atman-Brahman identity which was the second Indian emphasis I men-
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Honed above and to which I now turn very briefly is related to this last observation.
In the real-unreal maya world, selves occupy a privileged position. A homely
simile may convey the point. Consider a pail of water drawn out of a well. Let
the pail represent limitations of space and time; the water in the pail the
phenomenal self, the I of Descartes' Cogito. But a mere turning of the attention
to the matter will reveal that the real self in a certain sense of the word "real,"
is the water in the well of which the water in the pail is held up for inspection.
Or consider the infinite regress, I am Peter, I know that I am Peter, I know that
I know that I am Peter, etc. That which, in this regress, yi elds the infinite series
of the successive I's is the Brahman, and it is a most general Indian claim that
this sort of depth cannot be found, or perhaps built, into anything material. It is
in this sense, if I understand it correctly, that atman is Brahman or the self
is the Self. For the sake of convenience I write the first half (atman) with a small
s and the second Self (Brahman) with a large S, but even that is not necessary.
Atman and Brahman are identical.
It is against these two cardinal notions of the world being maya and of the
atman-Brahman identity, along with the notion that to live is to suffer, that
action must be looked at in Indian philosophy. The kind of action with which
the Indian theories originally dealt is sacrificial action, or religious ritual. Ever
since, Indian metaphysics has been intensely practical in the sense that it was
aimed at the realization of Brahman and never at the solution of metaphysical
problems as such. Knowledge meant a mental-spiritual state informed by the
realization of Brahman. Action which was a thing of time could, if properly performed, cause one to be translated to a heavenly realm- but even that was a
realm of time, while the realization of Brahman carried the connotation of
timelessness. Even an everlasting life of happiness is not the ultimate in the fulfilment of human destiny. Thus inasmuch as time is an element of the world,
the overcoming of time becomes the end-in-view of the characteristically Vedantic
way of life. This is summarized in the Katha Upanishad as follows: "When the
five instruments of knowledge stand still, together with the mind, and when the
intellect does not move, that is called the Supreme State."
This is the supreme state partly because the divine "sport" called history is
suffused by pain, or suffering- which refers to more than specific experiences
of unhappiness. Suffering is the distinction between the ideal and the fact,
between the desirable and the obtained, between tomorrow and today or viceversa. It is a thing of time itself and time will never remove it. Thus the celebrated
eleventh thesis of Marx against Feuerbach would impress the yogi as sheer lack
of discernment: to place one's hope in any plan within history and to seek one's
fulfilment in it is due to misconception.
We must observe that this view, and the consequent, very negative, appraisal
of action in this scheme do not immediately entail inaction. The question can
never be whether to do anything or not. The statement "I am not doing anything"
is indeed always literally wrong. The issue is not whether one should do anything.
It is, rather, what sorts of things should one do? A typical Indian answer to this
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last question is to be culled from two related Indian philosophical systems, the
Samkhya and the Yoga.
I suppose four ingredients go into the making of any viable metaphysics: a deep
existential concern, a measure of logical acumen, imaginative ingenuity and powers
of observation. The Samkhya and the Yoga systems have all of these. They are
different in some important respects, but it is their common elements that are
of interest to us here. The deep existential concern of the Samkhya-Yoga system
is to put an end to suffering which consists in freeing oneself from the tyranny
of names and forms. Even if the system is unsatisfactory, it does not contain
glaring logical inconsistencies. It is an imaginatively ingenious system based on
observation as follows:
We begin with that which is not directly available to inspection but which is
there wherever there is anything physical. The Sanskrit equivalent of the Scholastic
prime matter is Prakrti. The term "prakrti," however, is etymologically analyzable
into pro, meaning first, and kar meaning to make. At least in the Samkhya,
therefore, the term prakrti seems to carry the connotation of power. Rather than
"nature, " as is usually done , it would perhaps be less ambiguously rendered as
"energy-stuff" or "physical world."
The most significant observation of the Samkhya-Yoga is that there are in the
physical world three elements: the first has to do with the comparative refinement of things; some things are more refined than others: the human brain, for
example, would be more refined than a piece of rock. The second element is
elan as Bergson uses the term, and the third, impediment to elan or impulse.
When an arrow travels at n miles an hour and not at n plus 1, it is because
something is holding it at its given speed. That is the impediment. I could make
all this sound more esoteric and perhaps more profound by giving the Sanskrit
terms, but I will resist the temptation.
A significant assumption of the Samkhya-Yoga is that matter is matter and it is
not conscious at any level of refinement. It is perhaps as an accident of
language that the Samkhya-Yoga thinks of sensitivity or consciousness as something added to sheer matter. The theory appears to be that a cell for example,
is not living matter, but matter plus something called life. In this framework of
thought, in order to account for consciousness, the Samkhya-Yoga has to posit
something other than Prakrti which, added to Prakrti makes of people selfconscious organisms. This added thing is called Purusa, usually translated as
spirit, but better still as spirit-monad.
The question arises of course, how is spirit related to the physical world.
Having the benefit of modern technology we may illustrate the answer as
follows: consider an emission from a TV station. A mass of rusted iron will not
catch that emission but a TV set will. So far as I can follow the Samkhya-Yoga
text, that is the relation between spirit-monad and energy-stuff. This is what is
meant by the statement that at a certain level of refinement or purity, twhen
the sattvic element predominates, to use the technical phrase, the physical world
"reflects" spirit.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udr/vol9/iss2/6
38

4

Nersoyan: Action in Indian Philosophy
Knowing what we know of Indian, and, more specifically of Upanishadic
ethical-religious preferences, we can guess the remaining two important points
of the Samkhya-Yoga. One is that the physical world is the sort of energy-bearing
thing that is geared to let the spirit-monad go free in the end. Prakrti by itself
cannot exhibit consciousness, but a sort of intentionality is built into it, though
this is disputed by commentators. The other point is this: so long as the spiritmonad is under the impression that it in fact is what it only appears to itself,
namely as caught in the physical world, it is in a state of ignorance. So long, to
revert to our illustration, as the emission caught in this TV set thinks that it is
Dick Cavett, it is in ignorance, for the fact is that it is only a series of electrical
impulses. In the end, of course, all TV images are series of electrical impulses
and there is no real difference between Dick Cavett and Raquel Welch. They
only become Dick Cavett or Raquel Welch on the screen. But to get away from
TV boxes and personalities, we are saying that at the nodal point of consciousness
something other than matter, namely spirit must be posited.
The Samkhya-Yoga system was formulated two or three thousand years ago.
A question we may now ask could not have arisen in the minds of its framers.
This is the question: does a refined composition of energy-stuff have to be
produced by nature in order to reflect the spirit monad? Or would a similar
thing but man-made also reflect the spirit monad? Can a machine have consciousness? Had the Samkhya philosophers asked themselves this question, the
answer would have been as follows: the sort of thing we think of as spirit-monad,
which does not fit the description of what we think of as energy-stuff, must be
reflected in energy-stuff from the outside, as it were, for the latter to acquire
a quality we call consciousness. This is the way they would put it, though there
are of course many other verbal ways of expressing the same assumption which
remains untestable to date.
The metaphysical modality of the relationship between the physical world and
spirit-monads is crucial in the manner in which the Samkhya-Yoga system determines its theory of action. It is through the reflection of spirit in the physical
world that consciousness becomes possible. But then the danger is to be victimized
by a very genuine illusion. The danger is for the spirit-monad to take itself-asreflected for itself-i.e. the spirit-monad in its appearance for the spirit-monad
itself. It follows that the aim of the spirit-monad, "the informing self, silent,
peaceful, eternal" must be to seek release from the physical world as from a net.
Spirit is, in this scheme, essentially isolated in the sense that it is uninvolved in,
and even indifferent to all occurrences within Prakrti. It is a mere witness. To say
the same thing differently, Prakrti and Purusa do not share any attribute, assuming
existence is not an attribute.
This, then, is how the Samkhya-Yoga sees reality by way of reconciling, I
presume, the rational faculty with the felt need to put an end to frustrations,
while encouraging the will to exercise itself in that direction. The various transformations of the physical world are tor the emancipation of each spirit-monad.
We are given the example of a cook: "A cook having finished the cooking in
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which he was engaged retires from the work; similarly Prakrti or the physical
world being urged to action for the emancipation of the spirit, brings about the
emancipation and thereafter stops her operations with regard to that spirit whom
she has already liberated .... This action for another's sake," we are further told,
"is just like the action for one's benefit."3 We are told in Verse 64 of the Samkhya
that "from the repeated study of the truth, there results the wisdom, 'I do not
exist, naught is mine, 1 am not,' which leaves no residue to be known, is pure,
being free from ignorance, and is absolute." This is interpreted to mean "I am
the spirit, not productive" and because non-productive, "I have no action""Not I," and since without action, "I can have no possessions," hence "naught
is mine."
Action in the Vedanta is analyzed as a mark of impairment. Where there is
no imperfection there is no desire, and where there is no desire-or intention,
some need to be fulfilled, there is no action. And again, Section 55 of lhe
Samkhya reads: "Therein (Le. in the body) does the sentient spirit experience
pain arising from decay and death, due to the non-discrimination of the spirit
from the body; thus pain is in the very nature of things ." The commentary on
this verse remarks that the fear of death-"may I not cease to bel may I continue
to bel-being common to man as well as the smallest insect; and the cause of
fear constituting pain, death is a source of pain."
One may read old age instead of decay, in which case we realize that yoga
is also an attempt at overcoming the absurdity of the world, beyond action and
in silence.
It is to be expected that from this perspective the world should be viewed
as a theatre of change, but not of betterment. Pain is not an accident of anyone
period of history, it is built into the nature of existence itself. It is for this
very reason that action and all temporal existence belong in the same sphere,
inasmuch as in the absence of any pain action is not called for. "The vehicle of
action," the Yoga Sutra tells us, "has its origin in affliction," explaining that by
action both good and bad actions are meant. There is a certain level of spiritual
maturity where a necessary correlation is seen between virtue and vice on one
hand, and pleasure and pain on the other. But to the discriminating the mere
fact of change will produce a contrary effect in the very state of pleasure itself.
This is for the discerning self a matter of intellectual appraisal, rather than an
experiential awareness. Just as whenever there is a speeding object the specific
pace is an indication of a restraining power, even so in any pleasure there is an
element of pain. It follows that intensification of pleasure will entail the intensification of pain and the vehicle of action, as the Sutra calls it, becomes and
grows without promise of fulfillment.
By the same token frustration is built into striving. The solution is not, as
ordinarily done in Western circles, to elevate striving to a position of high
valuation and look upon palpable achievements as signs of divine favor. Nor is
it resignation to the view that civilization is the goal to achieve and discontent
is the price to pay. It is Yoga Sutra's claim that pain is avoidable; and that the
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cause of avoidable pain is the conjunction of the known and the knowable. The
desire to know is still desire, while the ideal is desirelessness.
"The knowable," moreover, "is of the nature of illumination, activity, and
inertia," a total perspective from which the choices open to a man are two :
emancipation and action or works. But this is a peculiar sort of practical
dualism in the sense that it is not a matter of either/ or. Even when emancipation
is chosen, action must be chosen as a means. And this is the logic of the organic
connection between the yogas of discipline, of works and of knowledge: the first
of these achieves unusual control of the body, including the inner organs such
as the heart; the second refers to a way of life or yoga morality; and the third
refers to the intuitive knowledge of Being.
We may conclude that action in Indian thought generally, must not be shunned,
for that is impossible. One must at least breathe. But the sphere of action must be
examined from the proper perspective and action must be controlled so as to be
used as a means of attaining non-action. It is because non-action alone , achieved
in the seedless trance, is of unmixed value that Isvara, Patanjali's finite god,
is a purusa or spirit among many, except that it has not experienced suffering, it
has been untouched by actions and the results of actions.
The end-in-view in the Samkhya-Yoga system, and this is typical of Indian
thought generally, is the disentanglement of spirit from the various transformations
-from the very sphere of the physical world. This will be the result of the
realization that in its true nature and status the spirit-monad is a witness, a
spectator, an enjoyer in this sense, but not an actor on the stage of phenomenal
existence, and the entertainment of such ideas in the mind is in keeping with a
self-validating experience known as moksa or samadhi, liberation or superconscious oneness with the object of meditation.
The Indian philosophical systems, though different among themselves, always
serve the same purpose: namely a movement away from the sphere of doing to
the sphere of being where there is no intentionality. Intentionality in the Samkhya
is when Prakrti or the physical world moves for self-negation for the emancipation
of Purusa or spirit. Doing leads to doing in a painful endlessness where one pain
replaces another except when that which is done is controlled to lead the doer
beyond its own sphere.
It is in the Bhagavad-gita that we find the dramatic application of this theory.
The purpose of the Bhagavad-gita is to drive home the point that one must place
oneself consciously within the One and thus turn into a spectator of one's own
actions as of those of every other agent. Thus is action seen in its true nature.
Obligatory actions will be performed without attachment, without love or hate
for the desirable or undesirable "fruit," without involvement, with the self as a
mere witness. This non-attachment which is a cardinal notion in the Gita, can
be the case, we are assured, without entailing disregard for consequences such as
injury, or underachievement. The doer, we are told, must be free from attachment, must have no streak of egotism, full of resolution and zeal, unmoved by
success or failure. From this perspective, the parting of the East and West would
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be at the point where the West takes it for granted that the individual is entitled
to do all he prudently can to preserve himself-and to make his own selfconscious life as pleasant as possible. To the East this is a hindrance or an impairment. The clinging to individual self-conscious life, the drive that makes one
say 'I want to live' is a cause of misery. It must be done away with, though not
through suicide, because suicide is self-assertion and only prolongs the agony
of the self in the realm of time. One must tame one's will and overcome oneself
by way of realizing the Brahman that one basically is. Self-consciousness is not
to be valued, a view which makes it difficult to give one's consent to the Indian
point of view. It is not only Western men who experience this difficulty. "I do
not want to be sugar. I want to taste sugar," an Indian disciple is reputed to
have said to his guru. The answer to this question takes on many shades in the
history of Indian philosophy, all of which may well be a variant of the biblical
injunction that he who is not ready to lose his life will not gain it.
Adverse criticism of the Indian theory of action and ethic may not be impossible.
Philosophical oversights, psychological and general welfare problems and even
economic grounds can be cited against them. Yet it does remain a viable option.
There is one ad hominem argument which the knowledgable Western observer
should guard against-and that is to hold Indian philosophy responsible for the
notorious plight of the Indian people. Overpopulation. for example. is a major
reason for that plight. and that is clearly in spite. and not because of the finest
insights of Indian philosophy. To hold Indian ethics responsible for the misfortunes of the Indian people would be equivalent to holding Christ or Marx
responsible for the mounting threats against decent living in our progressive West.

University of Dayton
NOTES
lThe Journal of Philosophy, vol. lxviii. No.9, p. 288.
2The Bhagavata ii, 9, 32. Cf. History of Philosophy Eastern and Western, S. Radhakrishnan et
al. eds., 'Vol. i, p. 123.
3Samkhya-karika, Ivi.
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